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IN T'HE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9656

DARRELL DEVERE POULSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant has appealed from a conviction of murder in the first degree upon jury trial in the Fourth
Judicial District, Utah County.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted of murder in the first
degree, and the jury, which heard the case, made no
recommendation for mercy. The appellant was, therefore, sentenced to death.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State contends the appellant's conviction should
be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State submits the following statement of facts in
supplement to those offered by the appellant.
On Saturday, September 16, 1961, the appellant,
Darrell DeVere Poulson, left Provo, Utah, and drove to
American Fork, Utah. He parked his automobile near
the apartment of Darlo Sawyer. He approached the
apartment, which was within a cluster of apartments, in
one of which Karen Mechling lived (R. 190-192, Exhibit
1). He knew the place he was looking for, because he
had resided there before (Exhibit 5). He ''window
peeked" at the apartment of Mr. Sawyer where Karen
Mechling was baby tending. He noticed the girl, who
was eleven years old (Exhibit 20), was asleep in a chair.
He tried the door, found it unlocked, then went back
about one-half block to the home of Harry Loader, where
he took a caulking gun. He returned to the Sawyer home
and quietly entered. He struck Karen Mechling in the
head with the caulking gun two or more times (Exhibit
5). He then carried the girl outside in the weeds behind
the home, where he raped her. Poulson later recalled
that she groaned during the rape and he used his fingers
to widen her vagina so that he could insert his penis
(Exhibit 5). During the rape, the child's vagina was
torn from high in the vaginal vault to the anus (R. 233).
2
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Karen Mechling died within four to five minutes from
the time the appellant struck her, and she died from the
blows to the head (R. 234-237). Semen was found in the
girl's vaginal vault by the examining pathologist (R.
237). After the crime, appellant went to the home of his
mother-in-law, took money from his wife's purse, changed
his clothes ''so no one would see the blood'' on him, and
left for Las Vegas (Exhibit 5). He was picked up in Las
Vegas, at the request of the Utah County Sheriff, for
another assault that was attempted hy the appellant on
another girl the same day as that upon Karen Mechling.
During the latter incident, he was scared off when someone "hollered" at him (R. 294). Upon being brought
back from Las Vegas, he confessed, almost spontaneuosly,
to the killing of Karen Mechling (R. 247, 248). The appellant did not endeavor to place -in.issue any other theory or
raise a lesser included offense. This is evidenced from
the defense counsel's statement to the court (R. 283) :
''Of course the offense is first degree· murder no
matter . . . in the instructions.''
The evidence before the jury, going to the appellant's mental condition, shows the following: The appellant attended public schools up to the eighth grade (Exhibit 21). He had a reasonably good attendance rate, but
his school marks were generally low, except in healtli
and physical education. His I.Q. level for this period,
however, showed a tendency to rise (Exhibit 21). A
teacher evaluation of the appellant made in the sixth
grade showed he displayed poor intellectual behavior,
but good aesthetic behavior, and that he was generally
3
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obedient and reverent (Exhibit 23). The appellant was
thereafter transferred to the Utah State Training School
at American Fork, Utah, after engaging in general criminal misconduct finalizing in an attack on his half-sister
in 1955 (Exhibit 24). He was discharged from the school
in 1958 (Exhibit 28). During his stay at the American
Fork School, he was allowed to visit at home on holidays
and weekends. He was also allowed away from the school
for extended visits with his mother (Exhibit 28). The
testimony also reflected that many persons who attend
the American Fork School are able to lead useful social
lives in their communities (R. 341-342). Counsel for
appellant admitted that the attendance of appellant at
the State school was of little importance (R. 372). The
school psychologist concluded that the appellant was
"mentally deficient" (R. 354). He was also classified as
being one of the most ''competent'' children at the school,
and was no trouble at the institution (R. 342).
The appellant's mother testified that the incident
came as a ''shock'' and a surprise and that she would
not have expected it (R. 350-351).
The strongest testimony for the appellant came from
Dr. Ija Korner, a psychologist, who examined the appellant on one occasion for 21j2 hours, during which time
he gave the appellant a few psychological tests (R. 362,
367, 375). He did not giYe the appellant a "complete"
I. Q. test but on the ''oral'' part of the \V echsler Bellvue
Test, the psychologist appraised the appellant's I. Q.
level at 67, which he said would be classified as "feeble
minded" (R. 364). He felt that intellectually speaking,
4
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appellant had "nothing on the ball." ( R. 364). He
further felt that appellant was suffering from ''mental
illness'' (R. 368). He defined such mental illness as where
an individual was unable to control his impulses (R.
395). He further indicated that he did not attempt to
ascertain whether appellant knew the difference between
right and wrong (R. 395-396). He characterized appellant's illness as a limited capacity to control or stem his
emotions (R. 368). He indicated that once "launched on
an impulse," appellant has no means to prevent the act
from being completed. Dr. Korner further indicated that
appellant's I. Q. could vary up to seven points. He testified that his opinion was not based upon a knowledge of
the particular facts of the case (R. 391). On cross-examination and in response to a hypothetical question posed
by the district attorney, Dr. Korner testified that it would
be ''possible'' that appellant acted under an impulse
over which he had no control (R. 393), but he could not
say at what stage the control would be lost (R. 397). No
questions relating to the appellant's intent were asked
Dr. Korner, and the only question that might have
weighed on the matter was without answer (R. 396):
'' Q. If he went into a room and hit a girl on the
head with an instrument such as this, (indicating)
from your examination would you be able to determine whether he knew what he was doing?
''A. Nobody can.

''Q. No one, you say?
''A. No one can. Only he and, I think, his
Maker.''
5
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A psychologist at the Utah State Hospital testified
that he interviewed the appellant on two occasions to
determine his I. Q. and personality integration. He gave
appellant a complete Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,
a complete draw a person, a complete Rorschach and a
complete Thematic Apperception Test (R. 410). He determined that the appellant had a score of 73 on the
verbal I. Q. test, 94 on the performance test, and a full
scale I. Q. of 81. From this, he concluded that the appellant had a "mild mental deficiency." (R. 412-413) He
also felt that the I. Q. test could vary from 5 to 7 points
(R. 414).
A psychiatrist at the State Hospital, Dr. Carl Kivler,
testified that he had been appointed to examine the appellant by the court. He saw the appellant on the 8th, lOth,
17th, 22nd and 29th of November, 1961, at which times
he made a psychiatric evaluation of the appellant. He
characterized the appellant's mental capabilities as being
"mentally retarded in a degree as mild." (R. 421) He
further testified that he felt appellant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of trial and at
the time of the crime (R. 423). He also \Yas of the opinion
that Poulson knew the nature and quality of his acts (R.
424). The doctor found no evidence of psychosis and
further discussed the facts of the case with the appellant
in some detail (R. 424). He was of the opinion that the
accused was a hle to control his emotions and was so
capable at the time of the crime (R. 425).
Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist, was also called
as a witness and testified (R. 433). He testified that upon
6
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examination of the appellant, he concluded that appellant was mentally deficient, and characterized it as a
"mild mental retardation." ( R. 435) The doctor found
no psychosis and felt that appellant knew the difference
between right and wrong, would understand the seriousness and gravity of the charges against him, the nature
and the seriousness of the consequences of his action, and
could control his impulses (R. 437, 438).
Additionally, the record reflects that the appellant
was married and attending school at the time of the crime.
Additional facts, as they relate to specific legal arguments, will be presented under the argument portion of
this brief.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

THE APPELLANT CAN CLAIM NO ERROR
BECAUSE OF A FAILURE OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT
THE MENTAL ~CONDITION OF THE APPELLANT COULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING HIS CAP A CITY TO INTEND AS
AN ELEMENT IN BURGLARY, SINCE:

A. THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED AT
TRIAL NOR DID THE APPELLANT PRESENT SUCH A THEORY IN DEFENSE,
NOR REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON SUCH
A THEORY, AND HAS, THEREFORE,
WAIVED ANY SUCH ISSUE.
B. THE LEGAL THEORY OF PARTIAL
IMPAIRMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO RAPE
MADE IRRELEVANT SUCH A THEORY.

7
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C. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED OF APPELLANT'S
IMP AIRED INTENT AT THE TIME OF
THE OFFENSE AS WOULD REQUIRE
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT ON THAT
ISSUE.
D. THE DOCTRINE OF "PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY" IS NOT COMPATIBLE
WITH PSYCHIATRIC REALITIES NOR
THE LEGAL TESTS OF INSANITY AND
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES OF
THIS NATURE.
* * * * *
A. THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED AT
TRIAL, NOR DID T'HE APPELLANT PRESENT SUCH A THEORY IN DEFENSE, NOR
REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON SUCH A
THEORY, AND HAS, THEREFORE, WAIVED
SUCH- ISSUE.
In the instant case, the appellant contends for the
first time, on appeal, that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that appellant's mental condition
might have been considered in determining whether or
not the appellant had the requisite intent for the crime of
burglary; and if he had no such intent, the jury should
have been instructed to return a finding of second degree
murder. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of first degree murder upon the theory of a killing
committed during the course of rape or burglary. Appellant's contention is that if the specific intent required for
burglary could not be formed b~T appellant, the jury could
have found the killing was not committed during the commission of burglary and, thus, a finding of second deg1~ee
murder would be required.
8
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The State submits the issue was never raised before
the lower court, and that since appellant did not advance
such a contention before the trial court, he may not raise
the issue for the first time on appeal. The record discloses that appellant's counsel at trial adopted an all or
nothing position. Thus, counsel stated (R. 283) :
''Of course the offense is first degree murder no
matter ... in the instructions.''
No questions were asked by appellant, either of his
own witnesses or those of the State, which related to
whether the appellant could entertain the requisite intent
to commit the crime of burglary. No instructions were
requested from the court specifically calling the jury's
attention to the weight of mental evidence on the intent
element of burglary. The appellant cannot now for the
first time contend that the trial court should have sua
sponte instructed on an issue which was not raised nor
any instructions requested thereon. It is stated in 41
C.J.S. Homicide, Sec. 414:
''The rule applicable in criminal cases generally, as discussed in Criminal Law §§ 1669-1700,
that questions cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal, together with the various subsidiary
and detailed rules as to the necessity, as a condition precedent to the review of a particular matter, of first calling it to the attention of the trial
court in some way as by motion, objection, or
request for an instruction, and of excepting to the
ruling of the trial court thereon and of assigning
the alleged error as a ground of a motion for a new
trial, is generally applied in homicide cases ; and
if error is not properly objected to in the lower
court it is waived."
9
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Certainly, the defendant has the duty, where he relies
upon an affirmative fact of exoneration, to prove that fact
and raise that issue. People v. Tidwell, 4 U. 506, 12 P.
61 (1886). The failure of defendant to carry this burden
in a homicide case precludes his claim of error. People v.
Rodriquez, 182 Cal. 197, 187 P. 423; People v. McCurdy,
140 Cal. App. 499, 35 P. 2d 569; Lee v. State, 27 Ariz. 52,
229 P. 939.
In State v. Thompson, 110 U. 113, 170 P. 2d 153
( 1946), this court expressly spoke against giving to a
jury an instruction where no issue or evidence has been
placed before them. The court stated:

"* * * We have repeatedly criticized the giving
of abstract statements of the law to the jury, and
held that it is the duty of the court to apply the law
to the facts supported by the evidence and to not
instruct on any question which is not involved in
the case under the evidence.''
Certainly, where defense counsel has expressly stated
that no issue of degrees of murder is involved, offered
no instructions, took no exception to the failure to give
an appropriate instruction, did not argue such a theory,
and did not pattern his evidence so it would fairly raise
the issue, the court has no duty to instruct the jury beyond stating the elements of the major offense. To compel such an instruction would place the trial judge in a
dilemma, since he would have the admonition in the
Thompson case to the contrary; and if he did instruct, a
defendant, in a similar position as appellant, could contend that such action could cause a compromise verdict
10
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to a lesser offense, whereas, otherwise, the jury may be
disposed to acquit, and thereby raise an issue of error.
The trial court, in this case, did instruct the jury that
a ''specific intent'' was needed in the crime of burglary
(R. 443). Further, the jury was instructed that there had
to be a union of act and intent (R. 448). If any additional
specific instruction were needed, it was certainly incumbent upon the appellant to request it at trial. Sta.te v.
Cobo, 90 U. 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936). His failure to do so
must be deemed a waiver of any claim on appeal.
It is submitted that an additional reason indicates
that the appellant consciously did not raise the issue of
mental impairment as it relates to specific intent. The
appellant requested an instruction from the court on the
so-called Durham test. Durham v. United States, 214 F.
2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). It has been held by the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia that the partial responsibility test is not applicable in the face of the Durhas test. Stewart v. United Sta.tes, 94 App. D.C. 293, 214
F. 2d 879 (1954); Stewart v. United Sta,tes, 275 F. 2d 617
(D. C. Cir. 1960). 1 It would, therefore, have been inconsistent with the position assumed by the appellant had the
court so instructed. See JJ!fark v. State, 236 Ind. 455, 141
N.E. 126 (1957) for recognizing the failure to raise a defense of mental abnormality on the basis of trial strategy.
It is submitted, therefore, that there was a waiver of
any claim to an instruction on reduced responsibility.
1 The court speaks of "diminished responsibility" but confuses "partial
responsibility" with the concept. See Williams, Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., Gen.
Part., Sections 172, 173.

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B. THE LEGAL THEORY OF PARTIAL
IMPAIRMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO RAPE MADE
IRRELEVANT SUCH A T'HEORY.
The theory upon which the instant case was submitted to the jury was upon the felony murder rule. The
felony murder statute encompasses both a killing committed during commission of the crime of rape and that
committed during burglary. Section 76-30-3, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. Burglary may involve entering a building in the night time to commit rape. Section 76-9-2, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. When the rape is actually consummated, two crimes have been committed, burglary
and rape.
Rape does not require a specific intent, but rather
only requires a general intent to commit the act. Thus,
in Walden v. Sta.te, 178 Tenn. 71, 156 S.W. 2d 305 (1941),
the Tennessee Supreme Court stated the general rule:
"In the crime of rape, no intent is requisite other
than that evidenced by the doing of the acts constituting the offense [citing authorities]."
The court therein held intoxication to be no defense to
a rape charge. This is supported by substantial authority.
McGuinn. v. Un.ited States, 191 F. 2d 477; Smith v. State,
38 So. 2d 347 (Ala.); Sta.te v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.
2d 158; 44 Am. Jur., Rape, Sec. 40. In Sta.te v. Mays, 225
N. C. 486, 35 S.E. 2d 494 (1945), the defendant was
charged with murder under the felony murder rule. The
defendant contended that his mental deficiencies should
be considered as to his capacity to deliberate or premedi12
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tate. The court noted that where a murder is committed
in the course of rape, the mental issue short of insanity
has no weight. The court stated :
"In this connection, we may note that the mental
capacity of the defendant to deliberate and premeditate is not at issue. If he possessed sufficient
sanity to enable him to commit the crime rape then
he is legally responsible for the homicide that
resulted. ' '
See also Commonwealth v. Prenni, 357 Pa. 572, 55 A.
2d 532.
It is submitted that when the intent to commit rape
would be the element of burglary involved, and when
the rape was in fact consummated, and an unlawful killing committed incident to rape, the intent aspect in burglary becomes secondary to the rape and specific intent
is, therefore, immaterial.
If the homicide is committed during the res gestae
course of rape, or incidental to the commission of rape, the
felony murder rule is applicable. MacAvory v. State. 144
Neb. 827, 15 N.W. 2d 45 (1944); Commonwealth v. Bolish,
381 Pa. 500, 133 R. 2d 464. The evidence in the instant
case clearly shows the commission of rape. Extensive
vaginal damage and the presence of semen was noted by
the pathologist, and the appellant's statement to the
sheriff indicated he approached the deceased child with
the thought of rape, and did in fact commit rape upon
her. The appellant by his statement makes clear he was
aware of his actions since he had to use his fingers to
effect penetration. The fact that the appellant took
13
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flight to escape also supports such a conclusion. This was
corroborated by the psychiatrists who examined the
appellant, since they testified to similar statements from
the appellant. Based on this evidence, it is clear that
the court, in instructing on burglary, granted the appellant a more favorable position than was necessary. It
is submitted that when uncontroverted evidence of rape is
shown, no issue of partial responsibility is involved since
no issue of specific intent is involved. To so construe
otherwise would place the jury in unnecessary confusion.

C. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED OF APPELLANT'S IMp AIRED INTENT AT THE TIME OF THE
OFFENSE AS WOULD REQUIRE THE
COURT TO INSTRUCT ON THAT ISSUE.
The appellant presented no evidence to the court
that would be sufficient to justify an instruction on the
issue of an impaired ability to intend. Not one question was asked of any of the psychiatric or psychological experts who testified as to whether the appellant
could harbor the specific intent to commit rape upon
entering the apartment where l{aren 11echling was baby
sitting. The only evidence introduced that could even
hear on the matter was that of Dr. Ija Korner, whose
opinion was that the appellant had an impaired ability
to control his impulses (R. 364). This conclusion was
based on the results of psychological tests. 2 Dr. Korner
testified specifically that he did not look to determine
whether the appellant understood the ''consequences of
2 Dr. Korner stressed that he was functioning as a psychologist and was
limiting his opinion to the results achieved from testing (R. 367, 383, 390,
392, 396, 401-402).

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

his acts," because it was not "part of my job." (R. 396)
The only question asked of appellant's key defense witness as to appellant's comprehension of his act at the
time, which would relate to his intent, was answered with
a conclusion that no one except the appellant and his
''Maker'' could tell. Finally, in response to a hypothetical question, Dr. l(orner said it was ''possible'' appellant
could not control his actions. This conclusion would be
insufficient to establish medical causation in a civil trial.
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 U. 436, 140
P. 2d 844 (1943); Chief Consolidated Mng. Co. v. Salisbury, 61 U. 66, 210 P. 929 (1922). The psychiatric testimony was that the accused was only mildly mentally deficient, and the appellant's background and childhood
did not indicate a total inability to comprehend.
It is submitted that the above-mentioned evidence
was not sufficient to require the court to instruct on the
issue of partial responsibility. In State v. Van Vlack, 57
Ida. 316, 65 P. 2d 736 (1937), the Idaho Supreme Court
was faced with a contention that it should adopt the
"partial responsibility" standard to reduce first degree
murder to second degree murder. The court refused to
hold it error to fail to give such an instruction. In the
first instance, the court rejected the theory of the rule,
but also noted that no evidence was before the court to
show that the defendant could not form the requisite
intent. The court held that mere testimony of ''mental
illness'' as such was not sufficient to require submitting
the case to the jury, since the jury should have evidence
before them showing the "line of demarcation" beyond
which a defendant's mental powers to intend would not
15
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go. Having established such a requirement, the court
stated:
''There are three reasons therefore why the
requested instruction was properly refused. * * *
no basis in law for a distinction between the mental ability to entertain deliberation and premeditation, and malice aforethought has been presented. * * * such line of demarcation was not and
has not been pointed out in the evidence adduced
by either party." (65 P. 2d at 759)
Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the
Deg·ree of Crime, 56 Yale Law Journal 959 (1947), at
page 97 4, made note of this aspect of the Van Vlack case :
''A third reason put forth in State v. Van
Vlack for rejecting the requested instruction was
that there was no demarcation made in the testimony between ability to entertain malice aforethought or deliberation and premeditation. The
medical evidence presented on behalf of the defense was that defendant did not know right from
wrong, and suffered from a delusion and a maniac
depressive form of insanity. There was no evidence and no standard by which the jury could
determine whether defendant had that greater
degree of mentality required to deliberate and
premeditate.
''This was a point of evidence. The requested
instruction was not supported by the evidence as
summarized by the court. This ground ''"as enough
to support the decision * * *.''
Certainly, evidence merely meeting the tests of general insanity and evidencing some mental problem is not
a sufficient showing to warrant the jury being· instructed
on the partial responsibility theory. Here, there was no
16
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evidence before the jury demonstrating how the appellant
could understand the nature and consequences of his act,
know right from wrong, and adhere to the right, yet still
have a. total impairment of his intent to commit the act.

In United Stales v. Storey, 9 U. S. C. M. A. 162, 25
C. M. R. 424 (1958), the defendant was convicted of
assaulting a military policeman in the execution of his
duties. The evidence showed the accused entered a barracks and fired his weapon at the wall. He was ordered
to leave and did so. An air policeman approached the
accused to apprehend him. The air policeman ordered
the accused to drop his weapon ; instead, the accused
advanced on the policeman and did not stop until the
policeman had fired four warning shots. A psychiatrist
testified that the accused was legally sane but was suffering from a' 'mental disorder'' falling within the character and behavior group. He further testified that the
accused's ability to adhere to the right was impaired and
he believed the offenses charged were largely the result
of the mental condition. He also stated his belief that the
accused's ability to adhere to the right was impaired and
degree of premeditation, intent, willfulness or malice required by the charges. The accused was convicted and
on appeal attacked the law officer's instructions to the
court on the question of partial responsibility. The government admitted the instruction was inadequate, but
submitted the evidence did not raise the issue or require
such an instruction and, hence, the error was not prejudicial. The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding the issue of partial responsibility was
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not validly raised. The court held that the evidence must
raise an issue of a "total" inability to intend. It stated:
''In the instant case there is a complete absence
of any evidence showing lack of capacity to intend,
as distinguided from an impaired ability to intend.
We conclude, therefore, that the issue of lack of
mental capacity to intend was not raised and
accordingly the law officer was under no duty to
so instruct.'' (Emphasis added)
The court required more than impairment, but rather
evidence of total inability to form the required intent.
In United States v. Qray, 9 U.S. C. M.A. 208,25 C. M. R.
470 (1958), the Court of Military Appeals had similar
evidence before it with a claim that an instruction was
required. The court again held the evidence insufficient
to warrant instruction.
In Commonwealth v. Markle, 394 Pa. 34, 145 A. 2d
544 (1958), the appellant, convicted of murder in the first
degree, contended that his mind was so ''disordered'' that
he could not have formed the specific intent. The court
noted:
''Markle contends that his mind was so disordered and confused that he could not have
formed the specific intent to kill his wife. There
is evidence indicating that appellant is emotionally
and psychologically unstable. There is no contention or evidence of insanity. While we agree
with the contention that appellant is not a normal
man, we cannot agree that the appellant did not
know what he was doing and thus had no specific
intent to kill his wife.
"It is undisputed that immediately after the
first shot, and again after the second shot, appel18
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lant told Leidy that he had shot and killed his
wife. He told James Barger, a State Policeman,
less than two hours after the killing, that he fired
the second shot to stop his wife from screaming
and moaning. Moreover he told Gus Zanos, the
arresting officer, less than thirty minutes after
the killing that he had killed his wife and that he,
'would do it again if [he] had to.' Less than two
hours after the killing, in response to a question
of Constable Roy Bruner, he said it was none of
Bruner's business why he had killed his wife. He
also told Bruner, 'It is me [Markle] that is going
to get the hotseat.' Finally in his written statement given less than seven hours after the killing,
he stated that he remembered getting the gun and
shooting his wife.
''A reading of the record indicates that John
Markle, an emotionally unstable man, enraged by
a slight scuffle with his wife, deliberately shot and
intentionally killed her while fully conscious of
his acts.
"Markle contends that this killing could not
rise higher than murder in the second degree because he· had a life-long history of emotional instability; he was a heavy drinker; he was discharged
from the Army because of psychoneurosis ; he is a
constitutional psychopath; from earliest childhood, he was never able to get along with his family; he severely bumped his head during· childhood
(as does every American boy) ; he attended twenty-seven different schools in eight years and could
not finish the eighth grade, he married a gir1 who
was only fourteen years old; he struck his wife
several times ; he had great difficulty in keeping
a job and changed jobs frequently. Assuming that
all of this is both accurate and true, it would not be
legally sufficient to justify a finding by the trial
judges of second degree murder. A fortiori it is
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not legally sufficient to warrant a finding by this
Court of abuse of discretion, or error of law, or
any error that would justify a reduction of the
crime to second degree murder.''
The evidence in the instant case is not as compelling
as that in Markle, which the court held would not justify
a finding of second degree murder. If such evidence would
not justify a finding, it would not justify an instruction
on the issue where the evidence is less compelling. Especia.lly would an instruction be out of order where the evidence was not of such definition as to allow a jury to
meet the issues.
The evidence in the instant case was certainly not
couched in terms of impaired intent nor was it sufficient,
in view of the above cases, to raise an issue as to the
appellant's ability to intend. Finally, the only evidence
suggestive of the issue was of a possible impaired ability
to control impulses, not a total inability to intend. This
evidence was based on psychological tests. In Stewart v.
Un.ited States,. 275 F. 2d 617, 624 (D. C. Cir. 1960), the
court that promulgated the Durham test refused to recognize partial responsibility where the evidence of
impairment was based on psychological tests. The court
noted:
''The concept relies essentially on intelligence
tests which are acknowledged by responsible psychologists and psychiatrists to be guides not absolutes in determining true intelligence or mental
capacity of a human being. The results of these
tests can vary materially depending on the education, training and environment of the subject.
Guttmacher and W eihofen state: 'The authors are
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in agreement with the general view of psychiatrists that at no time does the intelligence test,
or any other psychological test, alone establish
the diagnosis. They are ancillary defices of the
greatest value, but they cannot replace sound
clinical judgment.' Guttmacher & W eihofen, Psychiatry and The Law 179 (1952)."
It must, therefore, be concluded that even if the concept were sound in the present case, the posture of the
evidence did not warrant its application.

D. THE DOCTRINE OF "PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY" IS NOT COMPATIBLE
WITH PSYCHIATRIC REALITIES NOR THE
LEGAL TESTS OF INSANITY AND SHOULD
NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES OF THIS
NATURE.
The appellant as a basic premise to his contention
argues that a mental condition short of insanity may be
considered by the jury in determining whether an accused
could form any specific intent required in the commission
of the crime. It is submitted by the State that even if
there were not evidence of rape in this instance, thus
vitiating the need to consider the burglary claim, the law
should not be extended to encompass such a theory.
The appellant relies upon State v. Anselmo, 46 U.
137, 148 P. 1071 (1915), and Sta.te v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6
P. 2d 177 (1931), to support an application of his theory
to burglary. The Anselmo case primarily concerned itself
with the question of intoxication and epilepsy as they
may have inhibited the defendant in being able to premeditate where the killing was committed in a hurried or
21
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excitable state. 3 The case does not support an extension
to non-homicide crimes, nor does it support a claim that
any mental condition may be weighed in considering the
ability to specifically intend a crime where there is no
evidence of excitable or distracting circumstances that
would warrant concern as to whether a person could form
the required intent. No such circumstances are apparent
in this case. In State v. Green, supra, the question of
mental condition as it affected the ability to reflect and
premeditate was mentioned. The reference to the theory
was dicta since the case was reversed, adopting the '' irresistible impulse'' rule. In neither case did the court concern itself with an analysis of whether such a theory
should apply to lesser offenses, nor did it analyze the
theory to see as it was otherwise consistent with the
theories of mental responsibility.
To the degree that Anselmo and Green may relate
to the ability to premeditate during an excitable or emotional situation, they are not relevant to the instant case.
It is submitted by the State that they should not be applied beyond the above limitation, and that the theory of
partial responsibility is not reasonably consistent with
the test of insanity applicable in this State.
The doctrine of partial responsibility has been
rejected by the majority of the courts and jurisdictions
that have considered the matter. Fisher v. United States,
328 U. S. 463 (1946); Weihofen and Overholser, Jfental.
Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale Law
3 It is doubtful whether present medical knowledge would support a claim
that epilepsy would impair a premeditation in the absence of evidence of the
killing occurring during a fugue. Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry, p. 20 ( 1952).
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Journal959 (1947), p. 965. It is submitted that where the
test for insanity requires that the accused know the
nature and quality of his acts, know right from wrong
and he able to adhere to the right, that it is ludicrous to
say that a person could meet all these standards and yet
be totally unable to form the required intent. Especially
is this so in the case of using the absence of specific intent
in burglary to reduce a case to second degree murder. In
State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944), this
court said that in second degree murder, there need not
be a specific intention to kill, but a premeditated design
to cause great bodily harm or the doing of an act knowing
that the reasonable and natural consequences thereof are
likely to produce great bodily harm. Therefore, if appellant's theory were correct, the jury could find that appellant could not form the specific intent neeessary in burglary, but he could form a premedidated design to cause
great bodily harm, or know the consequences of his act
were likely to produce such results. Such legal compartmentalization of the mind is a clear absurdity. In Commonwealth v. Heidler, 191 Pa. 375, 43 A. 211 (1899), the
Pennsylvania court rejected such an absurdity, noting:
''To e,ay that a man is insane to an extent
which incapacitates him from fully forming an
intent to take life, yet enables him to fully and
maliciously form an intent to do great bodily
harm without a purpose to take life, is absurd,
for the one involves the same test of responsibility as the other, the ability to distinguish between
right and wrong."
See also State v. VanVlack, 57 Ida. 316, 65 P. 2d 736
(1937).
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Additionally, the theory advanced by appellant contemplates a division of intents, both specific and general,
not for legal classification, but a for weighing against the
mental capacity of the accused. This is, of course, a psychiatric absurdity. W eihofen and Overholser, supra,
56 Yale L. J. at 978. Where the defendant is fully incapable of forming the "intent" to act, he obviously cannot
adhere to the right or comprehend the nature and quality
of his actions, and should he acquitted. Williams, Criminal La.w, 2 Ed. General Part (1961), comments on the
practical realities of such a theory by noting:

'' * * * Although the argument is technically sound,
it appears, at least on the English view, to have
small practical importance as applied to insanity.
In practice the prosecution will nearly always
indict ·for the graver offence; generally the
accused, if he was insane at the time of the act,
will have to raise the defence of insanity if he is
to a void conviction; and the result of so doing
will (or should) be a verdict of insanity. No question arises therefore of convicting him of a lesser
offence." (Section 172 at page 540.)
The appellant contends that the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment (Gower Report) supported the
adoption of such a theory by the English Parliament in
the Homicide Act of 1957. This confuses what ·was in
fact adopted by Parliament in the Homicide Act. It was
a concept of "diminished responsibility" not based on a
failure of the accused to meet the guilt or innocence tests,
but reducing culpabilit)r because criminal justice and
"equity" require a reduction from the maximum punishment where it would not be carried out anyway. It is
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based on a diminished responsibility as to aU elements of
the crime. Williams, supra, page 541, Sec. 173. This
would require legislative action rather than a judicial
action. Mueller, CriminaZ Law and Administration, 1960
Annual Survey of American Law, p. 107-8. Infra page 33.
Substantial criticism has recently been directed
towards the feasibility and the logical basis of the limited
responsibility tests. United States v. Stewart, supra; 43
Cornell Law Quarterly 283 (1957). The general attack
takes two forms: (1) That the test is adequately encompassed in the general instructions on insanity; and (2)
that the psychiatric experience has not justified a distinction between being able to meet one mental standard
and not another when both involve the same psychiatric
realities. It is noted in 43 Cornell L. Q. 283 at page 284:
"It is conceded by psychiatrists that the bearing of a mental disorder on the crime committed is
not something which can be determined with any
degree of precision; the most that can be expected
is an estimate concerning the probability of connection between the crime committed and mental
condition * * *. The psychiatrist obviously would
serve only to confuse the jury by testifying in
medical terms usually unintelligible to a lay
juror.''
It is submitted that any extension of the partial
responsibility tests should await a more thorough investigation, and should at least be logically consistent with
allied legal principles and with medical science.
Finally, two reasons of a pragmatic nature, militate
against the acceptance of the appellant's position in
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Utah. First, if appellant's contention were deemed correct, in the case of a specific intent crime in a felony
murder case, the presence of mental impairment under
appellant's theory would reduce the degree of murder
to second degree. However, under the Green case, supra,
if the murder were charged as occurring with premeditation and not as a felony murder, the presence of
impaired mentality may reduce the degree to manslaughter. This would create an inconsistency not based
on reality. Secondly, Utah has no statutory scheme to
''treat'' people who may be found to suffer from diminished responsibility. Such persons would be handled like
regular prisoners which defeats much of the purpose for
the application of the doctrine. Silving, Criminal Law
of Mental Incapacity, 53 Jnl. of Criminal Law, Criminology and Pol. See. 129 (1962).
It is, therefore, submitted appellant's theory should
he rejected.
PorNT II

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION EMBODYING THE SOjCALLED
DURHAM RULE, SINCE:

A. THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS
INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER INST'RUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE APPELLANT.
B. THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT PROPER
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, AND NO BASIS FOR CHANGING
THE PRESENT RULE EXISTS.
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C. THE LEGISLATURE ALONE MAY PRESCRIBE A NEW RULE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY AT THIS TIME.
* * * * *
A. THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS
INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE APPELLANT.
The trial court is under no obligation to give an
instruction that would he inconsistent with other instructions or mislead or confuse the jury. State v. Erwin, 101
U. 356, 120 P. 2d 285 (1942); Abbott, Criminal Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 663. The appellant in his request
for additional instructions made a request embodying the
M'Naghten rules with the irresistible impulse theory
which was given in part by the court (R. 60, etc., Document Folder) Instructions 10 and 14.
Instruction No. 12, also requested (R. 62), embodied ,
the Durham test, which is inconsistent with M'Naghten.
Further requested Instruction No. 13 was inconsistent
with both theories. It does not appear from the record
that such instructions were proposed in the alternative.
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court, having
been deluged with various theories, some inconsistent
with the others, could properly refuse the requests on
this basis.

B. THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT PROPER
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, AND NO BASIS FOR CHANGING THE
PRESENT RULE EXISTS.
In the case of State v. McWhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P.
362, this court adopted the M'Naghten rules for deter-
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mining legal responsibility in cases of claimed insanity.
The standard set out by the judges in M'Naghten's
Ca.se, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Reprint 718 (1843), is
simply stated:
''To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.''
In State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931), this
court added to the basic structure of the M'Naghten
formula the so-called ''irresistible impulse'' test, which
simply requires that in addition the accused must be able
to adhere to the right. This has been the applied rule
in Utah since that time. Appellant would now ask the
court to abandon its previous test in favor of the rule
laid down in Durha;m v. United States, 214 F. 2d 852
(D. C. 1954), wherein the court stated:

'' * * * an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or defect." (Emphasis added)
It is noteworthy that the Durham court did not define
any of the terms it used as a basis for its test. Indeed,
the District of Columbia Circuit had some difficulty defining what was meant by the term product as used in the
rule, Carter v. Under! Stales, 252 F. 2d 608 (1937), and
substantial difficulty in defining what "\Yas meant by disease. Blocker v. U11ifed States,. 288 F. 2d 853 (1961). In
Sta1te v. Kirkham, 7 U. 2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859 (1958), this
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court took a detached look at an instruction embodying
the right and wrong test plus the irresistible impulse rule,
and concluded that the instruction was the proper test
to be applied in Utah. The court was aware of the Durham rule, but even so approved the standard of Staie v.
Green., supra, saying:
"In our opinion, the subject instruction, approved in State v. Green, strictly from the standpoint of what is most favorable for the accused in
a criminal case, is one of the most liberal that can
be found in the country. Reading it as we do, without indulging fine distinctions between legal and
medical terminology - frequently misunderstood
or not understood by laymen - and without espousing the philosophy advanced by some that the
question of insanity should he taken from the jury
and vested in professional people, we believe such
instruction to be the embodiment of almost all of
the approved instructions on the subject which
have been sired by M'Naghten's case (the socalled right and wrong test), State v. Pike (no
legal resonsibility if the act is the product of mental disease), People v. Schmidt (no legal responsibility if the accused did not know the act was
wrong morally), Durham v. United States (no
legal responsibility if the act is the product of
mental disease or mental defect), and what we believe to be the most recent case on the subject,
State v. Collins (right and wrong test representing the great weight of authority). In these cases
is found a wealth of authority practically exhausting the arguments that perennially are presented
in the continuing debate among professional men
as to what test properly should be applied in determining guilt or innocence where the factor of
mental disturbance of one degree or another is
involved.
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''The instruction we espouse, set out above,
pretty much represents a reflection of both facets
of the M'Naghten jewel, satisfied the eminent
Mr. Justice Cardozo's eruditely expressed preferences in the Schmidt case, should satisfy the
classmates of the irresistible impulse school, and
even should not be too offensive to the Durham
rule advocates.''
'Certainly, the Kirkham case can be claimed for the
proposition that Durham has no place in Utah. Durham
has not found support in other jurisdictions either. Recently, in Case v. State, 369 P. 2d 997 (Alaska 1962),
the Alaska Supreme Court was urged to abandon
M'Naghten the court noted that the Durham rule had been
rejected in "three federal courts of appeal, the United
States Court of Military Appeals, and the highest courts
of twenty states.'' With this in mind, it is submitted that
there is no basis that would warrant the State of Utah
in adopting the Durham rule. Certainly, the Durham case
has many defects, but the major reasons for rejecting its
adoption were summed up in the Chase opinion, where the
Alaska court. said :
''We are not persuaded to adopt Durham in
this jurisdiction. The 'disease-product' test has
no real meaning to us, and we venture to say,
would have none to jurors who would apply it to
the facts nor to the judges who would frame
inestructions. The terms 'mental disease' and
'mental defect' are not defined, and hence they
would mean in any particular case whatever the
experts say they mean. A further difficuity is that
the psychiatrists disagree on vlhat is meant by
'mental disease,' or even if there is any such
thing. We shall not impose upon the trial courts
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and jurors the formidable, if not impossible task
of understanding and applying terms whose meaning is unclear to acknowledged experts.
''We fully recognize the great difficulty in
many cases of ascertaining the mental condition
of an accused and of assessing its effect on his
conduct at the time of the commission of the criminal act. It is difficult because the criterion of responsibility cannot be defined with complete scientific precision; psychiatric evidence is technical
and complex, and diametrically opposed views will
frequently be expressed by expert witnesses. Because of these factors we consider it important
that the jury, which must make the final decision
as to criminal accountability, should be given as
far as possible clear and simple principles on
which to base their verdict. Such is not accomplished by the Durham rule.''
Although Durham received much comment and
acclaim upon promulgation, the operation of the rule in
practice and subsequent reflection of the premises upon
which it is based have led many authorities, apart from
the courts, to renounce its doctrine. Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 Catholic U. L.
Rev. 25 (1955); 116 Am. J. of Psychiatry 295 (1959) ;
Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1959 Annual Survey of American Law 111, 112-113. Further, one of the
strongest blows of all against the Durham rule came in
Blocker v. United States, 288 F. 2d 853 (D. C. Cir. 1961),
wherein Justice Burger of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia called for abandonment of the Durham rule. 4 Judge Burger found two principal defects in
4 Congress may well concur since H. R. 7052, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961,
proposed the adoption of the A. L. I. test rather than continue under Durham.
See also H. R. Rep. 563, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1961).
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the rule: (1) That the definition of "disease" was inadequate; 5 and (2) that the concept of "product" was without significant meaning.
Pro ha hly the most telling argument against its
adoption comes by virtue of the judges of the many courts
who have rejected the test. In State v. Collins, 50 Wash.
2d 740, 314 P. 2d 660 (1957), the Washington court concluded that they should:
'' [be] concerned * * * not only with what psychiatrists and writers for legal periodicals believe the
test should he, but with what trial judges * * *
believe would be the effect of any change.''
Washington most recently reaffirmed the M'Naghten
rule, Sta.te v. White, 374 P. 2d 942 (Wash. 1962).
Certainly, therefore, the weight of authority, as well
as reason, rejects adoption of Durham. It ,,~as stated by
Mueller & Pie ski, Criminal Law and Administration, 1961,
Annual Survey of American Law, 107, at 113, in commenting on a statutory adoption of Durham in Maine :
"The good people of Maine may not know it,
but they bought last decade's fashionable wardrobe. Really modern judges, legal scholars and
advanced psychiatry have long shed Durham's illfitting toga and returned to fitting and sensible
patterns.''
Appellant has further called to the court's attention
the recent American Law· Institute proposal in the Model
5 For a most compelling case in argument for the conclusion that mental
disease means only what the psychiatrist says it does, see In re Rosenfield, 157
F. Supp. 18 (1957).
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Penal Code. It suffices for this case to note that the test
was not passed on by the trial court. K evosek v. State, 8
Wise. 2d 640, 100 N.W. 2d 339 (1961). However, many of
the ambiguities of the Durham test are equally apparent
in the Model Penal Code, W eihofen The Urge to Punish
( 1956), p. 63-98, and more courts are declaring the question of the adoption of the Model Penal Code rule to be
one of legislative discretion and not for the courts. People
v. Johnson, 13 Misc. 2d 376, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 217 (1962).
Until such time as the knowledge of mental problems
reaches a point where it can be shown that the rule in
Green and Kirk harm should be replaced, these cases
should still control. People v. DeFr·arncesco, 20 Misc. 2d
854, 193 N.Y. S. 2d 963 (S. Ct. 1959). The most compelling argument, it is submitted, for continuing the present Utah standard is that the ultimate judgment is not
medical but moral, and the present tests adequately balance both aspects. 6

C. THE LEGISLATURE ALONE MAY
PRESCRIBE A NEW RULE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY AT THIS TIME.
It is submitted by the State that this court is, at
the present time, interdicted by statute from accepting
the Durham rule or any other test recently promulgated.
Section 68-3-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"The common law of England so far as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, and so far only as it is
6 Silving, supra, 53 Jnl. Criminal Law, Criminology and Pol. Sci.
129 ( 1962).
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II

r

consistent with and adapted to the natural and
physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and
shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this
state.''
The rule of common law that would be applicable
under this statute would be the common law as it was
generally conceded to be at the time of the adoption of
the above statute. R. S. 1898, Sec. 2488 ; Hatch v. Hatch,
46 U. 116, 121, 148 P. 1096. As a consequence, the general M'Naghten rules would be applicable to Utah
unless they were inconsistent with the "necessities of
the people" of Utah. It is not now a question of concern whether the court met this issue in State v. Green,
supra, when it adopted the irresistible impulse test;
however, this statute is presently applicable to the
criminal law of the state. Oleson v. Pincock, 65 U. 507,
251 P. 23; State v. Johnson, 44 U. 18, 137 P. 632; State v.
De(JJJ!l,, 69 U. 260, 254 P. 142. This court would only be
justified in abandoning the M'Naghten plus the irresistible impulse rule if it could he shown that they were
improper because of changed conditions, or unsuitable
as being too "harsh" or rigorous. Hatch v. Ha.tch.
supra. It is submitted that no such finding is possible.
This court rejected as much of a suggestion in the Kirkham case, supra. Certainly, the moral judgment implicit
in the present Utah test can hardly he said to have been
rejected by the times, nor can it be said to be inapplic.able to the needs of the citizenry. For this reason, it is
submitted that, for the present time, any change in the
standard of criminal responsibility should await legis34
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lative action. People v. Johnson, 13 Misc. 2d 376, 169
N. Y. S. 2d 217 (1962).7

PoiNT III
THE APPELLANT HAS NO BASIS UPON
WHICH TO CLAIM ERROR FROM THE SUMMATION ARGUMENT OF THE TRIAL
PROSECUTOR.
The appellant contends that the actions of the prosecutor for the State, in making his summation, were prejudicial to his rights. It is submitted that this contention
is wholly without merit. The import of the appellant's
contention is twofold. It is contended, first, that there
was placed before the jury a personal belief of the accused's guilt and, second, that the ''personal'' references of the prosecutor were of such a nature as to incite
the passions and prejudices of the jurors.
The first contention is based on the statement
appearing on page 451 of the record, set out on page
28 of appellant's brief. The essence of the statement is
that all of the public officials associated with prosecution and investigation of the crime had no doubt that
they "were trying the right man." This reference in
no way takes from the jury the sole issue before it of
the accused's mental responsibility. It is merely a clear
statement of fact that there is no doubt that the appellant committed the killing. The statement of the prosecutor was no more than the same statement made by
7 It might also be noted that even were this court to adopt a different
>tandard of insanity, it could avail the appellant nothing, since the evidence
supports exculpation under neither Durham or the A.L.I. standards.
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the defense counsel to the jury during opening argument
(R. 287):
''There is no question, ladies and gentlemen,
that the tragic and unfortunate thing has occurred, occurred over in American Fork on or
about the 17th of September. I don't think there
is any question but what Darrell Devere Poulson,
the defendant in this action, was a cause of this
unfortunate and tragic occurrence.''
Additionally, defense counsel stated on closing
argument that, "The crime was a terrible thing." (R.
459) The crime was a terrible thing and it is absurd to
say that when a prosecutor merely comments to the jury
that the accused is the person responsible for the crime,
a fact admitted during the course of the trial by both
sides, there has been any forensic error committed. The
facts of this case in this respect are not different from
those in State v. Jameson, 103 U. 129, 134 P. 2d 173
( 1943), where the court found a similar argument uno bjectionable. A prosecuting attorney has reasonable latitude in commenting to the jury on what is in fact a matter of uncontradicted evidence. Abbott, Criminal Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 651. There can, therefore, be no
serious claim of error on this point.
The second contention, that the prosecutor's comments, relating to the fact that he was familiar with
the incident and area where the crime occurred, were
error, is equally without merit. This statement must be
placed in the context in which it was given. A clear reading of the statement on page 452-3 of the record in no
way shows that because of these references, he was ask36
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ing the jury to take any action against the defendant. It
clearly appears that he was calling to the jury's attention the fact that his argument may be biased by the
fact that he was so close to the case. The statement was
obviously made in complete candor in order to have the
jury weigh the facts which he was then about to disclose. The statement, far from being legally objectionable, is to be commended, for it is well that a prosecutor call to the attention of the jury circumstances in his
background that may affect the weight of his argument.
It is unfortunate that appellant has sought to twist this
commendable action into a claim for prejudice when, in
fact, it benefitted rather than injured his position.
The appellant contends that a portion of the prosecutor's argument, to the degree that it refers to the horrible nature of the crime and the damage committed by
the appellant, is inflammatory. It should be remembered
that this case was a capital case in which, under Utah
procedure, the jury determines whether or not the
defendent must be put to death. It, therefore, is fully
proper for a prosecutor to weigh for the jury all the
community and social aspects of the crime, for these are
matters very much a part of the question of whether
the defendant should pay with his life. 8 The reference
in this instance was to the sorrow caused the relatives
and family of the victim. In State v. Zakoura., 145 Kan.
204, 68 P. 2d 11, 16 (1937), the Kansas Supreme Court
considered a similar claim of error in a murder case
where the prosecutor stated:
8 No more liberal person than Emmanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, espoused the same reasoning as a basis for criminal punishment.
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''* * * 'Gentlemen of the jury, as you go to the
jury room, think of that little grave down here in
the cemetery. * * * Let's not forget the sorrowing sisters -let's not forget the sorrowing relatives of the deceased.' ''
The Kansas court found the statement to be far from
prejudicial, noting that it must be clearly shown that
the statement was likely to prejudice the jury. At the
worst, it can be said the statement of the prosecutor was
an appeal to the sympathy of the jury, but this is not
a basis to claim error; for, a prosecutor, like a defense
counsel, may comment on all matters affected by the
crime, and sympathy for the deceased and those injured
by the crime is one of them. Abbott, supra, Sec. 655.
Certainly, in a capital case, the jury has a right to hear
from both sides on the merits of inflicting the death penalty and not merely be limited to receiving bland platitudes of mercy from the defendant.
The appellant contends that the comments of the
prosecutor were in fact personal references to a belief
of guilt or innocence. Such, they were not. They were
merely a deduction of fact from all the evidence and,
therefore, not objectionable. The general rule recognized in this area is stated in Wharton's Criminal Law
arnd Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 246:

'' * * * It is generally held, accordingly, subject
to certain exceptions, that statements by the prosecutor, in argument, indicative of his opinion, helief, or knowledge as to the guilt of the accused,
when made as a deduction or conclusion from the
evidence introduced in the trial, are permissible
and unobjectionable.''
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This court has recognized the general rule to that
effect in State v. M(J)rtinez, 56 U. 351, 191 P. 314 (1920),
also a murder trial. There the court said :
''Defendant also excepts to a statement made
in the argument to the jury by one of the state's
counsel who tried the- case to the effect that 'this
man (meaning the defendant) committed one of
the gravest crimes ever committed in the state of
Utah.' This was simply a statement of counsel's
opinion made in the- course of argument. Counsel
had the right to state his conclusions from the evidence even though his conclusions were wrong.
There was no error in this regard.''
See also State v. Spencer, 15 U. 149, 49 P. 302 (1897),
fora case of much more severe comment, wherein this
court refused to reverse. See also cases collected in 50
A.L.R. 2d 766.
Certainly, the prosecutor made no such objectionable statement as that made by defense counsel, which
is directly contrary to the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association, Canon 15, when he stated (R. 470),
''I am firmly convinced, myself, of the insanity of this
boy."
Finally, the appellant certainly cannot complain
where he failed to take exeeption or render an ohjeetion
to the argument. State v. Romero, 12 U. 2d 210, 364 P.
2d 828 ( 1961). The- general rule is noted in Warren,
Homicide, Vol. 4, p. 366 :
''As a general rule, improper conduct, argument, or statements by the prosecuting attorney at
a trial for homicide will not, in the absence of objection or exception at the trial, be available on
appeal or error.''
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See also Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec.
2079; Abbott, Criminal TriaJ Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 649;
People v. Hardenbrook, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 309 P. 2d 424;
Stale v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P. 2d 551. Indeed, the
strongest reason in favor of concluding that no prejudice
occurred to the appellant from the prosecutor's argument was the failure of experienced and capable counsel to object, move to strike, move for mistrial, or ask
for limiting instructions. This obviously leads to the
belief that the prosecutor's argument was thought to be
innocuous by defense counsel.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has been accorded a full and fair trial ;
the issues raised on appeal afford no basis for relief;
nor do they raise matters of such a nature as would
'warrant this court in ordering a retrial. The appellant
has committed a horrible and bestial crime, but the
processes of the law have been steadfastly accorded
him. Having received his days in court, having been
found guilty by a fair and impartial jury of citizens,
and no error having been committed that would warrant
reversal, this court should affirm and the appellant pay
for his crime with his life.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT !\:ESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Deputy Attorney General

.Attorneys for Respondent
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